Admitting Our Biases, Improving Ourselves
By Megan Burns
Think of the last time you made a judgment about someone. Maybe this was a first impression, or perhaps a defining moment in deciding whether or not you actually liked this person. What did you consider in making this judgment--or were you unaware of how you made the judgment, only noticing your decisive reaction? If we’re honest with ourselves, we can admit that we often can’t describe the processes behind our attitudes and judgments. We can’t easily explain what causes us to like one person and detest another, and when we try, our explanations are shallow and weak. This is because many of our cognitive processes are quick and unconscious, and while this allows us to live our lives without the burden of constantly evaluating every piece of stimuli we encounter, it also means we may make mistakes--and costly ones.
For a long time, the field of social psychology thought attitudes (broadly defined as our predisposed cognitive and behavioral responses to stimuli) were made consciously (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Allport, 1935). In the early 20th century, psychology was a relatively new field, and the idea of examining unconscious or semi-conscious processes seemed radical, particularly in regard to the strict methodological nature of the established scientific disciplines at the time. Studying the human mind already stretched the limits of the scientific method and was largely restricted to observing behavioral responses. The field called for “direct report”; therefore, examinations and measurements of attitudes were tested at the conscious level. But, as social psychologists began to examine these processes more closely, they found that conscious responses lagged behind attitudinal activation, suggesting that our attitudinal processes are less conscious than was previously believed (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto, 1992). This moment of discovery opened the door to how we study much of what social psychology studies today: stereotypes, implicit biases, and social perception.
A review by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) set the stage for the empirical study of implicit cognition. In their seminal paper, Greenwald and Banaji introduced the concept of implicit social cognition, which they use as a framework to explain and expand upon phenomena already observed within the field. One particularly compelling example was the dissonance between reports of unbiased opinions toward group members and biased behaviors. What Greenwald and Banaji established in this review paper eventually led to the now-famous “Implicit Associations Test” which demonstrated the very power of our unconscious biases in day-to-day life.
Since the establishment of the validity of implicit bias and other unconscious processes, scientists have applied these concepts to explain and attend to motivations, attitudes, and decision making processes. At the intersection of implicit biases and decision making lies Daniel Kahneman’s famous book Thinking, Fast and Slow which explicates two systems of thought: System 1 is “fast, instinctive, and emotional”, and System 2 is “slower, deliberate, and logical” (Kahneman, 2011). These systems of thinking are relevant to the discussion of implicit biases, because for a time, there was speculation about the relevance of implicit biases in System 2 thinking (System 1 was generally accepted susceptible to implicit biases).
Our awareness of our own cognitive deficits allows us to alter and improve how we think and behave. The practical applications of this knowledge are limitless. Glaser and Knowles (2008) found greater implicit association of black men with guns in a computer simulated experiment, as well as a greater likelihood to “shoot” armed black men over armed white men (Shooter Bias). This suggests to us that our implicit biases do have considerable real life consequences, particularly when we are making quick choices and snap judgments. More importantly, though, is that Glaser and Knowles (2008) found that “Participants who had a strong association between self and prejudice (high BOP) but a weak association between prejudice and bad (low NAP) showed the strongest relation between the implicit race-weapons stereotype and the Shooter Bias”. Thus, behavior is dictated not only by implicit judgment but by stereotypes. Stereotypes and biases are employed consciously and unconsciously, even in fast decision making scenarios.
The relationship between implicit biases and automatic cognition (or System 1 thinking) is generally considered plausible, and has been consistently demonstrated in psychological experiments (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001). There is greater debate about the role of implicit bias in System 2 thought. The legal system typically requires evidence of “explicit, intentional racism”, but psychologists studying racial bias have found it often to be implicit and unconscious (Levinson, 2007). While explicit racism can be disguised in the court system, implicit biases cannot be hidden and have been observed in jurors’ prolonged and conscious decision making. Levinson (2007) demonstrated that jurors “remembered and mis-remembered legally relevant facts in racially-biased ways”. The criminal justice system relies on the fair and equitable judgment of character by jurors and judges, but if these judgments are influenced by racially-biased cognitive processes, then the fairness of the system must be called into serious question.
These are only two of the many instances in which implicit bias--specifically implicit racial bias have been demonstrated in Fast and Slow thinking (Kahneman, 2011). The role of implicit bias extends beyond racial bias, and beyond aggression and legal decision making. Outside the scope of this article, there is a realm of observed biases with dire implications, such as medical students expressing racial bias in spite of increased interaction with African American patients and diversity training, (Burke et al., 2017). The role of racism in our country has shifted, and while instances of explicit racism have decreased, implicit racism has remained prevalent (Gilens, 1995). One notable product of implicit racial biases has been the unnerving number of innocent black men killed by police officers in the past few years. Our evidence indicates that these instances are not merely devastating--they are racially motivated. It is imperative that we continue to examine the role of implicit bias in processes of motivation, judgment, decision making, and person perception. However, it is not enough to merely examine these processes--we must provide comprehensive solutions that encourage awareness and change on multiple levels: structurally, interpersonally, and individually.
Think of the last time you made a judgment about someone. Were you aware of your own biases? Can you identify why you liked or disliked them? Asking ourselves these questions is an important first step to understanding the biases which underlie our daily cognitive processes. If we are to change the biased and stereotyped norms of our current social state, we must acknowledge our own individual role in either perpetuating bias or initiating change.
References:
Glaser, J., & Knowles, E. D. (2008). Implicit motivation to control prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(1), 164-172.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated reasoning on political decision making. The Journal of Politics, 64(4), 1021-1044.
Perreault, S., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1999). Ethnocentrism, social identification, and discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 92-103.
Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. Journal of personality and social psychology, 81(5), 800.
Cikara, M., Botvinick, M. M., & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Us versus them: Social identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. Psychological science, 22(3), 306-313.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological review, 102(1), 4.
Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes.
Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991).
Levinson, J. D. (2007). Forgotten racial equality: Implicit bias, decisionmaking, and misremembering. Duke LJ, 57, 345.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude activation effect. Journal of personality and social psychology, 62(6), 893.
Kahneman, D., & Egan, P. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow(Vol. 1). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 60(4), 509.
Burke, S. E., Dovidio, J. F., Perry, S. P., Burgess, D. J., Hardeman, R. R., Phelan, S. M., Cunningham, B. A., Nelson, D. B., Yeazel, M. W., *Przedworski, J. M., & van Ryn, M. (in press). The effects of formal and informal training experiences on explicit bias against African Americans among medical students: A report from the Medical Student CHANGE Study. Social Psychology Quarterly.
Gilens, M. (1995). Racial attitudes and opposition to welfare. The Journal of Politics, 57(4), 994-1014.
Think of the last time you made a judgment about someone. Maybe this was a first impression, or perhaps a defining moment in deciding whether or not you actually liked this person. What did you consider in making this judgment--or were you unaware of how you made the judgment, only noticing your decisive reaction? If we’re honest with ourselves, we can admit that we often can’t describe the processes behind our attitudes and judgments. We can’t easily explain what causes us to like one person and detest another, and when we try, our explanations are shallow and weak. This is because many of our cognitive processes are quick and unconscious, and while this allows us to live our lives without the burden of constantly evaluating every piece of stimuli we encounter, it also means we may make mistakes--and costly ones.
For a long time, the field of social psychology thought attitudes (broadly defined as our predisposed cognitive and behavioral responses to stimuli) were made consciously (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Allport, 1935). In the early 20th century, psychology was a relatively new field, and the idea of examining unconscious or semi-conscious processes seemed radical, particularly in regard to the strict methodological nature of the established scientific disciplines at the time. Studying the human mind already stretched the limits of the scientific method and was largely restricted to observing behavioral responses. The field called for “direct report”; therefore, examinations and measurements of attitudes were tested at the conscious level. But, as social psychologists began to examine these processes more closely, they found that conscious responses lagged behind attitudinal activation, suggesting that our attitudinal processes are less conscious than was previously believed (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto, 1992). This moment of discovery opened the door to how we study much of what social psychology studies today: stereotypes, implicit biases, and social perception.
A review by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) set the stage for the empirical study of implicit cognition. In their seminal paper, Greenwald and Banaji introduced the concept of implicit social cognition, which they use as a framework to explain and expand upon phenomena already observed within the field. One particularly compelling example was the dissonance between reports of unbiased opinions toward group members and biased behaviors. What Greenwald and Banaji established in this review paper eventually led to the now-famous “Implicit Associations Test” which demonstrated the very power of our unconscious biases in day-to-day life.
Since the establishment of the validity of implicit bias and other unconscious processes, scientists have applied these concepts to explain and attend to motivations, attitudes, and decision making processes. At the intersection of implicit biases and decision making lies Daniel Kahneman’s famous book Thinking, Fast and Slow which explicates two systems of thought: System 1 is “fast, instinctive, and emotional”, and System 2 is “slower, deliberate, and logical” (Kahneman, 2011). These systems of thinking are relevant to the discussion of implicit biases, because for a time, there was speculation about the relevance of implicit biases in System 2 thinking (System 1 was generally accepted susceptible to implicit biases).
Our awareness of our own cognitive deficits allows us to alter and improve how we think and behave. The practical applications of this knowledge are limitless. Glaser and Knowles (2008) found greater implicit association of black men with guns in a computer simulated experiment, as well as a greater likelihood to “shoot” armed black men over armed white men (Shooter Bias). This suggests to us that our implicit biases do have considerable real life consequences, particularly when we are making quick choices and snap judgments. More importantly, though, is that Glaser and Knowles (2008) found that “Participants who had a strong association between self and prejudice (high BOP) but a weak association between prejudice and bad (low NAP) showed the strongest relation between the implicit race-weapons stereotype and the Shooter Bias”. Thus, behavior is dictated not only by implicit judgment but by stereotypes. Stereotypes and biases are employed consciously and unconsciously, even in fast decision making scenarios.
The relationship between implicit biases and automatic cognition (or System 1 thinking) is generally considered plausible, and has been consistently demonstrated in psychological experiments (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001). There is greater debate about the role of implicit bias in System 2 thought. The legal system typically requires evidence of “explicit, intentional racism”, but psychologists studying racial bias have found it often to be implicit and unconscious (Levinson, 2007). While explicit racism can be disguised in the court system, implicit biases cannot be hidden and have been observed in jurors’ prolonged and conscious decision making. Levinson (2007) demonstrated that jurors “remembered and mis-remembered legally relevant facts in racially-biased ways”. The criminal justice system relies on the fair and equitable judgment of character by jurors and judges, but if these judgments are influenced by racially-biased cognitive processes, then the fairness of the system must be called into serious question.
These are only two of the many instances in which implicit bias--specifically implicit racial bias have been demonstrated in Fast and Slow thinking (Kahneman, 2011). The role of implicit bias extends beyond racial bias, and beyond aggression and legal decision making. Outside the scope of this article, there is a realm of observed biases with dire implications, such as medical students expressing racial bias in spite of increased interaction with African American patients and diversity training, (Burke et al., 2017). The role of racism in our country has shifted, and while instances of explicit racism have decreased, implicit racism has remained prevalent (Gilens, 1995). One notable product of implicit racial biases has been the unnerving number of innocent black men killed by police officers in the past few years. Our evidence indicates that these instances are not merely devastating--they are racially motivated. It is imperative that we continue to examine the role of implicit bias in processes of motivation, judgment, decision making, and person perception. However, it is not enough to merely examine these processes--we must provide comprehensive solutions that encourage awareness and change on multiple levels: structurally, interpersonally, and individually.
Think of the last time you made a judgment about someone. Were you aware of your own biases? Can you identify why you liked or disliked them? Asking ourselves these questions is an important first step to understanding the biases which underlie our daily cognitive processes. If we are to change the biased and stereotyped norms of our current social state, we must acknowledge our own individual role in either perpetuating bias or initiating change.
References:
Glaser, J., & Knowles, E. D. (2008). Implicit motivation to control prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(1), 164-172.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated reasoning on political decision making. The Journal of Politics, 64(4), 1021-1044.
Perreault, S., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1999). Ethnocentrism, social identification, and discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 92-103.
Dasgupta, N., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. Journal of personality and social psychology, 81(5), 800.
Cikara, M., Botvinick, M. M., & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Us versus them: Social identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. Psychological science, 22(3), 306-313.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological review, 102(1), 4.
Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes.
Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991).
Levinson, J. D. (2007). Forgotten racial equality: Implicit bias, decisionmaking, and misremembering. Duke LJ, 57, 345.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Govender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude activation effect. Journal of personality and social psychology, 62(6), 893.
Kahneman, D., & Egan, P. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow(Vol. 1). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 60(4), 509.
Burke, S. E., Dovidio, J. F., Perry, S. P., Burgess, D. J., Hardeman, R. R., Phelan, S. M., Cunningham, B. A., Nelson, D. B., Yeazel, M. W., *Przedworski, J. M., & van Ryn, M. (in press). The effects of formal and informal training experiences on explicit bias against African Americans among medical students: A report from the Medical Student CHANGE Study. Social Psychology Quarterly.
Gilens, M. (1995). Racial attitudes and opposition to welfare. The Journal of Politics, 57(4), 994-1014.
